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I. INTRODUCTION
High moral character and legal competence are fundamental
prerequisites for admission to the practice of law.' It necessarily
1. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE OF RuLEs FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1988) which
require 1) completion of a full course of study in an A.B.A. accredited law school, 2) completion
of an A.B. or B.S. degree, 3) completion of an LL.B. or J.D., 4) successful completion of the bar
examination, and 5) good moral character.
The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmiITy EC 1-2 (1981) states that "[tihe public should
1
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follows that first-time applicants with past felony convictions and
attorneys who seek reinstatement after disbarment for a felony con-
viction must also possess these characteristics to be authorized to
practice. 2 A felony conviction has an uncertain affect on the like-
lihood of admission. The uncertainty affects the first-time applicant
and the petitioner for reinstatement alike. Although a felony con-
viction results in mandatory disbarment in most states,3 this denial
of the "right" to practice law is not necessarily permanent. 4 More-
over, a felony conviction does not automatically preclude an initial
applicant from admission to the bar.5 A felony conviction is just
one factor that courts and state bar associations consider when re-
viewing applications for admission or readmission. 6 A felony con-
viction is, however, one factor that suggests unfitness to practice
law because it provides an inference of bad moral character. 7
Felonies have traditionally been considered crimes of moral
turpitude8 that indicate a moral flaw in a person's character.9 It is
be protected from those who are not qualified to be lawyers by reason of a deficiency in education
or moral standards . . . ." (footnotes omitted)
DR 1-101 (B) of the MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL REsPONsmILrrY (1981) states that "[a] lawyer
shall not further the application for admission to the bar of another person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute."
2. See generally, Annotation, Falsehood, Misrepresentations, Impersonations, and Other Ir-
responsible Conduct as Bearing On Requisite Good Moral Character for Admission to Bar, 30 A.L.R.
4'T 1020, § 4 (1984); Annotation, Criminal Record as Affecting Applicant's Moral Character for
Purposes of Admission to the Bar, 88 A.L.R. 3D 192, § 2 (1978); Annotation, Reinstatement of
Attorney After Disbarment, Suspension, or Resignation, 70 A.L.R. 2D 268, § 20 (1960); In re Boone,
90 F. 793 (C.C. N.D. Cal. 1898).
3. Note, Disbarment: Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating Unfitness to Practice, 43 COR-
NELL L.Q. 489, 490 (1958).
4. Annotation, Reinstatement of Attorney After Disbarment, Suspension, or Resignation, 70
A.L.R. 2D 268, §§ 2-3 (1960).
5. See, e.g., 7 AM. JuR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 16 (1980).
6. Id. See also Annotation, 70 A.L.R. 2D Reinstatement of Attorney 268, § 2 (1960).
7. In re O'Connell, 199 Cal. 538, 250 P. 390 (1926); In re Manville, 538 A.2d 1128 (D.C.
1988) (citing In re Manville, 494 A.2d 1289, 1295-96 (D.C. 1985)); In re Glucksman, 57 A.D.2d 205,
394 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1977), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 804, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 367 N.E.2d 658 (1977).
8. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals defined "moral turpitude" in Committee on
Legal Ethics of the W. Va. State Bar v. Scherr, 149 W. Va. 721, 726, 143 S.E.2d 141, 145 (1965)
(citing 58 C.J.S. Morals at 1201 (1948)), as "an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties
which one person owes to another or to society in general, which is contrary to the usual, accepted
and customary rule of right and duty which a person should follow."
9. Historically, once a person was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, that person's
character was considered permanently tainted. That view is reflected in the statement that "[t]he public
[Vol. 91
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difficult for an applicant to overcome the stigma of a felony con-
viction and persuade the state bar and the state supreme court to
grant admission to the bar.10 Therefore, the petitioner for reinstate-
ment, who is a convicted felon, has a heavier burden to prove fitness
than a first-time applicant who has no criminal record." Of course,
the first-time applicant with a felony conviction must also bear the
burden of showing rehabilitation, which is not borne by the appli-
cant without a criminal record.'2
The review process for admission or reinstatement of convicted
felons to the bar involves balancing the interests of individual justice
against the need to preserve the integrity of the bar. 3 The courts'
primary interests are those of protecting the public from unscru-
pulous lawyers and serving the public interest by impartially ad-
ministering justice. 14 Courts are not unmindful of the need for justice
for the individual who has undergone genuine reformation. How-
ever, they place supreme importance upon their duty to protect the
public.
The balancing process does not, however, lend itself well to ap-
plication of clear-cut guidelines; therefore, courts generally avoid
have [sic] a right to demand that no person shall be permitted to aid in the administration of justice
whose character is tainted with dishonesty, corruption, crime ..... Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 293,
320 (1863).
Another theory viewed character as a set of consistent character traits. "Moral and religious
philosophers since Aristotle have presupposed the existence of determinate character traits, leading
to virtuous and nonvirtuous behavior. Much of the early work in psychology theory began from the
premise that fundamental personality dispositions governed social conduct." Rhode, Moral Character
as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 556-57 (1985) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Rhode].
10. In re Brown, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567 (1980). A petitioner must demonstrate a
record of rehabilitation sufficient to prove to the court that there is little likelihood of a repeat of
unprofessional conduct. "In addition, the court must conclude that such reinstatement will not have
a justifiable and substantial adverse effect on the public confidence in the administration of justice,
and in this regard the seriousness of the conduct leading to disbarment is an important consideration."
Id. at 234, 273 S.E.2d at 571. See also State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 9, 630 P.2d 711, 714 (1981).
11. Brown, 166 W. Va. at 234, 273 S.E.2d at 571. The Supreme Court of Appeals noted that
in order to overcome the adverse effect of a prior disbarment, an applicant must demonstrate a record
of rehabilitation. In addition, the Supreme Court of Appeals commented that the more serious the
original offense the harder it would be for the applicant to prove present fitness.
12. Manville, 538 A.2d 1134 n.7 (quoting In re Manville, 494 A.2d 1289, 1295 (D.C. 1985)).
13. See, e.g., In re Stump, 272 Ky. 593, 596, 114 S.W.2d 1094, 1096 (1938); In re Raimondi,
285 Md. 607, 618, 403 A.2d 1234, 1239 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980).
14. Stump, 272 Ky. at 596, 114 S.W.2d at 1096; Raimondi, 285 Md. at 618, 403 A.2d at 1234.
15. Annotation, Reinstatement of Attorney, 70 A.L.R.2D 268, § 9 (1960).
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the enunciation of hard-and-fast rules. 16 Instead, courts apply broad
principles and judge each case on its own facts.' 7 One source of
difficulty is the determination of what constitutes good moral char-
acter.
The good moral character requirement has generated much dis-
cussion because of its ambiguous and inherently subjective nature.' 8
As evidence of the subjectivity of the standard, some courts refuse
to consider any offense so grave as to automatically preclude fit-
ness, 19 while other courts hold that the most egregious offenses may
forever bar a person from the practice of law. 20
This article will examine the subject from two angles: 1) from
the standpoint of admission of first-time applicants with criminal
records, and 2) from the standpoint of reinstatement of attorneys
disbarred for a felony conviction.
First, this article will survey the historical development of the
principles and practices in West Virginia reinstatement law and de-
termine whether a felony conviction might currently operate as a
permanent bar to reinstatement. West Virginia law will be compared
to the general rule and, where possible, will be identified as con-
sistent or inconsistent with the majority view.
Second, this article will examine the issues related to bar ap-
plicants who suffered felony convictions or indictments prior to in-
itial application for admission. General standards for admission of
felons will be discussed, then compared and contrasted to the prin-
ciples for readmission.
16. The author observed that "[hiard and fast rules .. . are inappropriate in this area, par-
ticularly since evidence of rehabilitation plays an important role in good moral character cases involving
past illegal conduct." McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral Character Requirement
for Bar Admission, 60 NoTE DACmE L. Rav. 67, 89 (1984).
17. In re Harrington, 367 A.2d 161, 163 (Vt. 1976).
18. See, e.g., McChrysta, supra note 16; Rhode, supra note 9; Comment, Past Crimes and
Admission to the Bar, 5 J.LEGAL PROF. 179 (1980) (authored by Laura Gunn); Comment, Admission
to the Bar - "Good Moral Character" - Constitutional Protections, 45 N.C.L. REv. 1008 (1967)
(authored by Wallace C. Tyser, Jr.); Comment, Bar Examinations: Good Moral Character, and Po-
litical Inquiry, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 471 (authored by Moria C. Mackert).
19. See, e.g., In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 452, 333 N.E.2d 429, 433 (1975).
20. See, e.g., In re Rothenberg, 108 Ill.2d 313, 326, 484 N.E.2d 289, 295 (1985); In re Wolff,
173 La. 257, 136 So. 583 (1931).
[Vol. 91
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II. READMISSION STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO FELONS IN WEST
VIRGINA2
A. Early Reinstatement Cases in West Virginia
An early case involving a petition for reinstatement of an at-
torney disbarred as a result of a criminal conviction is In re Daugh-
erty.22 In Daugherty, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
held that reinstatement is, in general, within the "sound discretion
of the court passing upon the application. An applicant for rein-
statement must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy
the court that he is a fit person to be entrusted with the privilege
of practicing law.''23 The court held that the "deciding question"
is "whether the applicant is of good moral character." 24
The Supreme Court of Appeals distinguished, however, a court's
inherent power to admit an attorney to its bar and disbar an attorney
21. The By-Laws of the West Virginia State Bar do not mandate special discipline for the
commission of felonies per se. Rather, "[a]ny court in which any attorney shall be convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude or professional unfitness shall, as a part of the judgment of conviction,
annul his license to practice law." W. VA. BAR BY-LAws, art. 6, § 23 (1988). Felonies are usually
considered crimes involving moral turpitude, and disbarment is generally reserved for offenses of
moral turpitude. Therefore, for purposes of this article, and except where otherwise noted, reinstate-
ment after any disbarment will be considered equivalent to reinstatement after disbarment because
of a felony conviction.
22. In re Daugherty, 103 W. Va. 7, 136 S.E. 402 (1927). The issues involved whether the
petitioner had been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor and whether the Circuit Court of Cabell
County was authorized under the West Virginia Code to prevent the petitioner from practicing in
other circuit courts if the petitioner had been convicted of a misdemeanor. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals cited State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250, 10 S.E. 407 (1889), wherein the court
interpreted section 6, chapter 119, of the West Virginia Code (1887) as granting the Supreme Court
of Appeals or any circuit or county court authority to permanently and absolutely annul an attorney's
license to practice in all courts of the state upon conviction of a felony.
The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the Cabell County Circuit Court's order which denied
the petitioner's reinstatement to practice before it, but reversed the circuit court's order insofar as
it purported to inhibit the petitioner from practicing in courts outside Cabell County. The Supreme
Court of Appeals reasoned that section 215 of the federal Criminal Code, which the petitioner was
convicted of violating, was not defined by the statute as a felony, nor was the offense a common
law felony; therefore, the offense must be classified a misdemeanor.
The Supreme Court of Appeals held, therefore, that the Cabell County Circuit Court did not
have the authority to disbar or suspend the petitioner from practicing law in courts outside Cabell
County. Annulment of an attorney's license to practice in all courts is absolute.and may not be
exercised without statutory authorization.
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from its bar from the statutory power to annul an attorney's license
to practice law. The former power affects only the attorney's right
to practice in a particular court whereas the latter power affects an
attorney's right to practice anywhere in the state where the license
was issued.
The holding in Daugherty made clear that a court has the in-
herent power to reinstate an attorney who has suffered a common-
law disbarment for misconduct. The holding did not make clear,
however, whether the state's courts had the power to reinstate a
convicted felon whose license had been statutorily annulled. Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court of Appeals did not address whether
a felon whose license had been annulled could even apply for a new
license and petition for reinstatement. A reasonable interpretation
of the opinion would be that statutory annulment of an attorney's
license to practice is absolute and final, without any provision for
future restoration or replacement.2 5
Subsequent to the 1931 revision of the West Virginia Code, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals addressed some of these
issues when it answered certified questions from the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County in Ex Parte Mitchell.26 Although the offenses
for which the petitioner was disbarred were not specified in the
opinion, the court noted that the original disbarment was based on
seven counts of malpractice and was instituted under Chapter 30,
Article 2, Section 7 of the West Virginia Code (hereinafter W. Va.
Code) .27
The Supreme Court of Appeals found that the circuit court had
annulled the license of the petitioner and had not merely disbarred
25. The basis for this "reasonable" interpretation is the quotation from McClaugherty, 33 W.
Va. at 257, 10 S.E. at 409, which interpreted section 6 of chapter 119 of the West Virginia Code of
1887 to apply "only to cases the object of which is to suspend or annul the license of an attorney
absolutely and in all courts . . . ." Daugherty, 103 W. Va. at 10, 136 S.E. at 403. In addition, by
interpreting the federal offense to be a misdemeanor and holding, therefore, that the statute did not
apply, the Supreme Court of Appeals appears to have been attempting to avoid the harshness of a
mandatory and permanent state-wide disbarment.
26. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E.2d 771 (1941). The petitioner in this case had
been disbarred by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County pursuant to chapter 30, article 2, section
7 of the West Virginia Code. This statute authorizes the Supreme Court of Appeals or any West
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the petitioner from practice; therefore, the circuit court was without
jurisdiction to alter or set aside the disbarment order after it had
"become final by adjournment of the court for the term at which
it was entered .... "28 Upon annulment of the petitioner's license,
the attorney's license was "totally terminated for all purposes, and
incapable of revitalization . . . . [These statutes make no provision
for the restoration or reinstatement of such license, certificate or
registration after revocation or annulment. '"29
The Supreme Court of Appeals did not expressly reject the prop-
osition that an attorney could be relicensed and reinstated after suf-
fering an annulment. However, by pointing out the lack of statutory
provision for "restoration or reinstatement of such license," 30 the
court appeared to implicitly hold that an attorney who was statu-
torily disbarred subsequent to a felony conviction would be per-
manently precluded from readmission to the practice of law.
Moreover, even though the Supreme Court of Appeals listed three
successive steps necessary for admission to the practice of law,3 the
court made no mention of standards or principles upon which to
base consideration for readmission. Unfortunately, the narrowness
of the issue prevented the court from clearly stating the ultimate
fate of a disbarred convicted felon, but a reasonable interpretation
of the court's holdings allows the conclusion that a convicted felon
would be permanently barred from readmission to the practice of
law based on the operation and interpretation of the statutes of West
Virginia.
28. Id. at 283, 14 S.E.2d at 771.
29. Id. at 289-90, 14 S.E.2d at 774.
30. Id.
31. At the time of this opinion, three successive steps were required to practice law:
(1) A certificate from the circuit court that the applicant is twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and a resident of the county for one year next past; (2) a license
to practice law, or a diploma from the college of law of West Virginia University; and (3)
an actual admission to the bar of a court of record and the taking of the required oath.
Mitchell, 123 W. Va. at 289, 14 S.E.2d at 773.
Note, however, that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals abolished the diploma privilege
by rules adopted in 1985 and amended in 1986. W. VA. CODE OF RULEs FOR ADMSSION TO m
PRACTICE OF LAW Rule 1.2 (1988). Students graduating from the West Virginia College of Law after
July 1, 1988, must pass the bar examination to be admitted to the bar.
1989]
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B. Recent Reinstatement Cases in West Virginia
When the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided In
re Daniel,3 2 it clearly held that an attorney whose license to practice
law had been annulled could subsequently apply for another license
and seek readmission. The court stated that "[a]lthough an annul-
ment forever terminates the license held by the attorney at the time
it was annulled, it does not prohibit the application by such an
attorney for a new license to practice law as if he had never been
issued a license." 33 The court agreed with the general rule that dis-
barment or annulment is not final and affirmed the position that
the burden rests on the petitioner to show rehabilitation and good
moral character. 4
The Daniel court also held that the court might require that
certain conditions be met before the license is reissued, even after
a showing of good moral character by the petitioner.35 However,
the procedure for reapplication for a license delineated in Daniel is
32. In re Daniel, 153 W. Va. 839, 173 S.E.2d 153 (1970). Although disbarment was not a result
of a felony conviction in this case, the license of the petitioner had been annulled as a result of
incidents of serious malpractice; therefore, the petitioner was in the same situation as a convicted
felon who would be seeking a new license subsequent to an annulment.
33. Id. at 844, 173 S.E.2d at 156 (citations omitted). At the time this case was argued, there
was considerable confusion and disagreement as to the right of an attorney to reapply for a new
license after an annulment. The initial position of the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia
State Bar was that an annulled license was forever terminated. The Committee conceded, however,
that the Petitioner stood in the same position as one who never had a license to practice law and
only needed to comply with the established rules for admission to seek a new license.
When the Petitioner thereafter attempted to show compliance with the statutory rules for ad-
mission, the Committee changed its position. The Committee then took the position that Part H,
Article VI, § 31 of the WEsr VmGINIA STATE BAR BY-LAWs prohibited an attorney whose license had
been annulled from seeking readmission. The Committee based its position on the contention that
the admission requirements of chapter 30, article 2, section I of the West Virginia Code did not apply
to a person who once possessed a license that was later annulled.
The dissent agreed with the Committee and argued sharply that the admission rules set out in
chapter 30, article 2, section 1 of the West Virginia Code applied only to first-time applicants, as
evidenced by the age requirement. Daniel, 153 W.Va. at 847, 173 S.E.2d at 157 (Browning, President,
dissenting).
The dissent argued, further, that Article VI, Part H, § 31, of the West Virginia State Bar By-
Laws provided not only for permanent license annulment but also for irrevocable termination of the
right to practice law in the state. The basis for the dissent's argument was the fact that the article
did not "contemplate any subsequent application by an attorney whose license had been revoked and
forever terminated." Daniel, 153 W. Va. at 847, 173 S.E.2d at 157.
34. Id. at 844, 173 S.E.2d at 156.
35. Id.
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straight-forward and does not appear to be onerous if the petitioner
can satisfy the statutory requirements in W. Va. Code § 30-2-1 and
demonstrate that he possesses good moral character2 6 The West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals merely reasserted its "inherent power
to supervise, regulate and control the practice of law in [West Vir-
ginia, including its] inherent power to grant or refuse the license to
practice law .... "37
At the time of the Daniel opinion, the Supreme Court of Appeals
still had not established standards by which to judge the qualifi-
cations of petitioners for reinstatement to the bar following a license
annulment.
In 1979, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals amended
the By-Laws of the West Virginia State Bar and subsequently decided
In re Brown.3 8 In Brown, the Supreme Court of Appeals found it
necessary to explain the procedures for reinstatement and clarify the
theory of license reinstatement following an annulment resulting from
a felony conviction. 9 The Brown court also instituted formal pro-
cedures to review license reinstatement petitions and laid the foun-
dation for the adoption of standards by which to review them.
40
The Brown court held, in particular, that Article VI, § 35 of the
West Virginia State Bar By-Laws "provides the right for a disbarred
attorney to petition this Court for license reinstatement after five
years have elapsed since the date of his disbarment.'"41 Reading sec-
36. Id.
37. Id. at 842, 173 S.E.2d at 155.
38. In re Brown, 164 W. Va. 234, 262 S.E.2d 444 (1980). In this case, the petitioner sought
reinstatement of his license to practice law. The petitioner's license had previously been temporarily
suspended pending the outcome of an appeal in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of his conviction
for conspiracy to commit bribery and bribery of a juror. Upon affirmation of the conviction, the
petitioner's license was annulled by order of the court on December 21, 1973. See In re Brown, 157
W. Va. 1, 197 S.E.2d 814 (1973).
39. The petition for reinstatement was before the court, along with an answer filed by the
Committee on Legal Ethics. Because the Ethics Committee believed no evidentiary hearing was nec-
essary in order to petition for reinstatement after a five-year disbarment period, no evidentiary hearing
was held before the petition for reinstatement had been filed with the court. The case, therefore, was
remanded to the Committee on Legal Ethics to conduct such a hearing. Brown, 164 W. Va. 234,
262 S.E.2d 444.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 235, 262 S.E.2d at 445.
1989]
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tions 35 and 4 of Article VI in pari materia, the court decided under
its supervisory powers that "the Committee on Legal Ethics of The
West Virginia State Bar shall hold an evidentiary hearing to [make]
a record [of] the issue relating to the petitioner's qualifications to
have his license reinstated. " 42 The petitioner may or may not request
a hearing before the Supreme Court of Appeals, but, if the petition
is made, the court will then make its decision whether to deny or
grant the petition and may premise reinstatement upon "such terms
and conditions" as it deems necessary. 43
As a justification for the additional procedures, the Supreme
Court of Appeals noted that "courts have traditionally cast a heavy
burden on the petitioning attorney to demonstrate his fitness for
reinstatement."" The court reiterated that "[tihe ultimate question
is whether he possesses the integrity, high moral character and legal
competence to justify the reinstatement of his license." ' 45
Without expressly adopting the factors, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals listed the factual inquiries specified by the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the case of In re Hiss.46
The Hiss factors are commonly used to judge whether a petitioner
has met the burden of proof on the requirements for reinstatement.
These factors are:
(1) the nature of the original offense for which the petitioner was disbarred, (2)
the petitioner's character, maturity, and experience at the time of his disbarment,
(3) the petitioner's occupations and conduct in the time since his disbarment, (4)
the time elapsed since the disbarment, and (5) the petitioner's present competence
in legal skills.-
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals included one ca-
veat in the procedures it established. The court held that even though
it approves the By-Laws per W. Va. Code § 51-1-4a, approval does
not mean that the By-Laws "become the sole standard to define
42. Id. at 240, 262 S.E.2d at 447.
43. Id. at 236, 262 S.E.2d at 445.
44. Id. at 237, 262 S.E.2d at 445.
45. Id. at 237, 262 S.E.2d at 446.
46. In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975).
47. Brown, 164 W. Va. at 237-38, 262 S.E.2d at 446 (quoting Hiss, 368 Mass. at 460, 333
N.E.2d at 437-38 (citations omitted)).
[Vol. 91
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and control the practice of law and regulate the conduct of attor-
neys." ' 4 The court expressly declined to hold that the By-Laws are
the "only source of power" to regulate the practice of law, as that
would constitute an abdication of the court's inherent responsibilities
and its express mandate under W. Va. Code § 51-1-4a. 49
Brown established the proposition that disbarred attorneys are
entitled to a full and fair hearing when petitioning for reinstatement.
In order to provide a full hearing, the Supreme Court of Appeals
must implement procedures to produce a better factual record and
adopt better standards by which to judge petitions for reinstatement.
The court will, however, jealously guard its ultimate, inherent
rule-making and decision-making power over the practice of law in
general, and reinstatement of disbarred attornies in particular. Even
though formal review procedures are mandated, the court, never-
theless, can require more than what is mandated because of its ability
to exercise its discretionary power over the bar. The Supreme Court
of Appeals will not be bound by the rules if it feels justice requires
deviation.
Late in the same year in which Brown was decided, the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided In re Smith.50 In Smith,
the Supreme Court of Appeals had the opportunity to review a pe-
tition for reinstatement using the standards cited in Brown and its
recently established procedural framework for providing an eviden-
tiary record.
48. Id. at 239, 262 S.E.2d at 447.
49. Id.
50. In re Smith, 166 W. Va. 22, 270 S.E.2d 768 (1980) (opinion withdrawn). The petitioner's
license was annulled after his felony conviction had been affirmed by the United States Supreme
Court. The report of that proceeding is in In re Smith, 158 W. Va. 13, 206 S.E.2d 920 (1974). The
petitioner was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C § 241, which makes it a federal crime to conspire to
"stuff" ballot boxes with fraudulent and fictitious ballots.
Note that Smith, 166 W. Va. 22, 270 S.E.2d 768 (1980) (opinion withdrawn), granted reinstate-
ment on October 7, 1980, and was withdrawn November 25, 1980, due to misstatements of law in
the opinion. Nevertheless, the opinion established the standards used to judge reinstatement petitions.
A revised opinion was refiled on November 25, 1980, as a slip opinion. Hereinafter, the published
reporters will be cited wherever the language is identical to the revised opinion, otherwise, the slip
opinion will be cited.
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The majority's decision to reinstate the petitioner's license elicited
an exceptionally vehement dissent by Justice Miller" and appears to
be an aberration in the jurisprudence of reinstatement when a license
has been annulled due to a conviction of a felony or other crime
of moral turpitude.
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Neely, called Ar-
ticle VI, § 35 of the West Virginia State Bar By-Laws a "rule of
compassion" 52 in that it provides for reapplication for a license to
practice law by an attorney whose license has been annulled. Even
though the court implied that it may be possible for an offense to
be so serious as to preclude reinstatement,5 3 the court gave only a
slight indication of what type of offense might preclude such a pos-
sibility. Instead, Justice Neely asserted that the concept of permanent
disbarment had been rejected since In re Daniel.5 4 Moreover, the
court held that permanent disbarment is a disproportionate punish-
ment which must surrender whenever rehabilitation can be dem-
onstrated for the statutory five-year period.55
The standard for rehabilitation was not intended to make re-
instatement impossible to attain. Rather, the standard was designed
to make proof of rehabilitation a realistic possibility.56 Therefore,
upon proof of rehabilitation for the statutory period, the court would
ordinarily grant reinstatement. The court likens the requisite five-
year rule to ordinary situations where an individual has had his
51. Justice Miller disagreed with nearly every holding of the majority as well as the majority's
rejection of the Ethics Committee's unanimous recommendation to deny reinstatement at this time.
Smith, 166 W. Va. at 32, 270 S.E.2d at 774 (1980) (Miller, J., dissenting). In short, the only issue
on which the dissent appears to implicitly concur with the majority is the issue that the Petitioner
might be entitled to reinstatement upon a proper showing of rehabilitation. Otherwise, the dissent
considered the majority opinion "a disservice to the legal profession, the public at large, and to the
courts .... ." Id. at 40, 270 S.E.2d at 778.
52. Id. at 32, 270 S.E.2d at 774.
53. The court said, "[t]here are obviously occasions where the underlying offense which caused
the loss of a license is so serious that the Court cannot be confident that the petitioner is sufficiently
rehabilitated that the public will be adequately protected. This is particularly the case where the
underlying offense was directly related to the practice of law." In re W. Bernard Smith, No. 13493,
slip op. at 9 (W. Va. Nov. 25, 1980).
54. Smith, 166 W. Va. at 25, 270 S.E.2d at 770 (citing In re Daniel, 153 W. Va. 839, 173
S.E.2d 153 (1970)).
55. Id. at 26, 270 S.E.2d at 771.
56. In re W. Bernard Smith, No. 13493, slip op. at 9, 10 (V. Va. Nov. 25, 1980).
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citizen's rights restored after conviction of a crime and completion
of a sentence.1
7
In the final analysis, the court adopted and applied the Hiss
standards introduced in the earlier Brown 8 opinion. The court held
the petitioner's offense "reprehensible, but . . . completely unre-
lated to the petitioner's law practice or activities as an officer of
the Court."5 9 The factors regarding the petitioner's character, ma-
turity, and experience at the time of the disbarment were of no
consequence in the court's decision. The court held that these factors
are applicable only in the case of a youthful offender.6 0
The court considered the petitioner's occupation during the time
after his disbarment and held it to be "honorable" and "accept-
able," notwithstanding his lack of regular gainful employment.61 The
petitioner's independent means of support lessened the importance
normally placed on gainful employment during disbarment. Another
factor weighing in favor of the petitioner was the fact that the pe-
titioner kept abreast of current developments in law and legal lit-
erature in general.6 2
The Supreme Court of Appeals ultimately held that, without a
showing by the Committee on Legal Ethics that reinstatement will
endanger the public, an attorney's license to practice law will be
reinstated after five years of good behavior, unless the original of-
fense was so serious that even a record of honest living will not
assure safety to the public. 63 The standards for judging reinstatement
applications appeared to be settled, notwithstanding the apparent
aberration of the Smith decision. However, the location and the
nature of the burden of proof were still not clear. Justice Miller
maintained very persuasively in his dissenting opinion that the bur-
57. "The five year rule is consistent with other decisions of this Court regarding restoration
of rights after an individual has been convicted of a crime and served his sentence." Smith, 166 W.
Va. at 27, 270 S.E.2d at 771.
58. In re Brown, 164 W. Va. 234, 237, 262 S.E.2d 444, 446 (1980).
59. Smith, 166 W. Va. at 31, 270 S.E.2d at 773.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 32, 270 S.E.2d at 773.
63. In re W. Bernard Smith, No. 13493, slip op. at 12 (W. Va. Nov. 25, 1980).
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den of proof must remain on the petitioner to prove more than
mere honorable behavior during the five-year disbarment to warrant
reinstatement.64
Several questions were not resolved by the Smith case: 1) what
kind of felony or other crime of moral turpitude would warrant
permanent disbarment, if any, and 2) how will the criteria be applied
in future reinstatement cases of former convicted felons? Given the
Smith holding and the burden of proof debate, prediction of future
outcomes would have been difficult. The uncertainty was ironic after
the recent development of the readmission standards and procedures.
Less than three months after the Smith case, the court decided
In re Brown.65 Brown involved the reapplication of Bonn Brown to
the practice of law.6 6 This case is especially important because it
clarified points of law which were thought to be misstated and left
unclear by the Smith opinion67 and established relatively clear stan-
dards by which to judge reinstatement petitions of convicted felons.
In contrast to the opinion in Smith, Justice Miller's opinion in
Brown thoroughly reviewed the relevant case law of West Virginia
and other jurisdictions. The Brown opinion established the read-
mission standards for future cases and answered the question of
what kind of offense might warrant permanent disbarment.
In addition, Brown reestablished the importance of considering
the integrity of the bar and the effect of a reinstatement on public
confidence.68 The court noted that the common theme of prior dis-
ciplinary cases is that lawyers occupy a "special position" as min-
isters of the legal system.6 9 The public, therefore, has a vital
expectation of integrity in the bar and the administration of justice.70
Maintenance of the bar's integrity is thus of vital importance, and
64. Smith, 166 W. Va. at 33, 270 S.E.2d at 774.
65. In re Brown, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567 (1980).
66. Bonn Brown's prior petition for reinstatement was remanded to the Committee on Legal
Ethics. Brown, 164 W. Va. 234, 262 S.E.2d 444. See supra note 39.
67. Brown, 166 W. Va. at 228, 273 S.E.2d at 568.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 232, 273 S.E.2d at 570.
70. Id. at 232-33, 273 S.E.2d at 570.
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"reinstatement of a disbarred attorney must be determined in part
by ascertaining its impact on public confidence in the administration
of justice and the integrity of the legal system. '" 7 1 Having reiterated
the importance of the public interest, the court stated the general
rule:
[A] disbarred attorney in order to regain admission to the practice of law bears
the burden of showing that he presently possesses the integrity, moral character
and legal competence to resume the practice of law. To overcome the adverse
effect of the previous disbarment, he must demonstrate a record of rehabilitation.
In addition, the court must conclude that such reinstatement will not have a
justifiable and substantial adverse effect on the public confidence in the admin-
istration of justice, and in this regard the seriousness of the conduct leading to
disbarment is an important consideration.2
The Smith opinion held that an order of permanent disbarment,
after an applicant had already suffered the legal penalty, would
merely "heap additional punishment upon the offending attorney."
73
Implicit in the Smith holding is the idea that once an offending
attorney has paid the legal penalty, there should be a presumption
of rehabilitation. 74 The Brown opinion rejected any such presump-
tion in favor of the petitioner. Instead, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals held that rehabilitation must be determined by a course of
conduct that assures the court that it is probable that a reinstated
attorney will not repeat unprofessional conduct.
75
The court reiterated the importance of the nature of the offense
resulting in disbarment by saying "the more serious the nature of
the underlying offense, the more difficult the task becomes to show
a basis for reinstatement.
' '76
The court also reestablished the deference given to recommen-
dations of the Ethics Committee by holding that "absent a showing
of some mistake of law or arbitrary assessment of the facts such
71. Id. at 233, 273 S.E.2d at 570.
72. Id. at 234, 273 S.E.2d at 571.
73. In re Smith, 166 W. Va. 22, 27, 270 S.E.2d 768, 771 (1980) (opinion withdrawn).
74. Indeed, this is an express point in the withdrawn opinion that was omitted from the revised
opinion. Smith, 166 W. Va. at 30-31, 270 S.E.2d at 773. See also In re Smith, No. 13493, slip op.
at 6 (f. Va. Nov. 25, 1980)..
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recommendations made by the Ethics Committee . . . are to be
given substantial consideration. ' 77 The Court recognized that the
expertise and position of the Ethics Committee warrant deferential
consideration.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Appeals returned to the facts of
the case to consider the nature of the underlying offense that led
to disbarment. For the first time, the court would consider a petition
for reinstatement where the principles of law were well developed,
the procedural law had been followed as developed, and the un-
derlying offense was a serious felony.78 Furthermore, the offense
involved the perversion of the justice system, which every lawyer
has a sacred duty to honor and preserve. 79
The Supreme Court of Appeals quoted from several disbarment
and reinstatement cases to show the gravity of the offense and reveal
the court's sentiment that if there is any offense so serious as to
warrant permanent disbarment, bribery of a juror must be it.80 The
court was finally confronted with an offense which it considered so
serious that it could not in good conscience allow reinstatement.
The court contended that it was unaware "of any case where
an attorney convicted of bribing a juror has been reinstated."' The
court conceded, however, that an attorney was reinstated after a
conviction of perjury in Hiss,82 but noted that the attorney in that
case had been disbarred for 22 years and had the benefit of favorable
findings of the Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers.
In the instant case however, the petitioner's plight was aggravated
by the fact that he had entered a plea of nole contendere and was
convicted of an additional crime involving moral turpitude, that of
bribing public officials of the State of West Virginia. 3
77. Id. at 236, 273 S.E.2d at 572.
78. See supra note 38.
79. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1987).
80. Brown, 166 W. Va. at 236-37, 273 S.E.2d at 572 (quoting In re Barron, 155 W. Va. 98,
102, 181 S.E.2d 273, 275 (1971), and In re Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 548-49, 50 N.E.2d 785, 787-88
(1943)).
81. Brown, 166 W. Va. at 237, 273 S.E.2d at 573.
82. In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429 (1975).
83. Brown, 166 W. Va. at 238-39, 273 S.E.2d at 573.
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The court ultimately held that
[b]ecause of the extremely serious nature of applicant's original offense of bribing
a juror when coupled with the separate conviction of conspiring to bribe public
officials, we cannot help but conclude that his reinstatement would have a jus-
tifiable and substantial adverse effect on the public confidence in the adminis-
tration of justice ....
We have held in Smith that the seriousness of the underlying offense leading to
disbarment may, as a threshold matter, preclude reinstatement such that further
inquiry as to rehabilitation is not warranted. The offenses involved in this case
manifestly meet this test and for this reason applicant's petition for reinstatement
is denied 4
The review was complete after determination that the offense
was so egregious and violative of the principles of legal integrity
that public confidence would necessarily be harmed by reinstate-
ment. The Supreme Court of Appeals did not consider the possibility
of petitioner's rehabilitation and gave no indicationas to whether or
not future rehabilitation might make his reinstatement possible.
A reasonable interpretation of the opinion leads to the conclusion
that conviction of certain felonies, such as ones involving bribery
of jurors and fundamental perversion of the justice system, will
almost certainly preclude the possibility of reinstatement.
After Brown, a convicted felon may still reapply for a license
to practice law and petition for reinstatement to the bar. As a pre-
liminary matter, however, the court will consider the nature of the
underlying offense and whether the offense is one that strikes at the
very heart of the justice system. The court will weigh heavily whether
reinstatement would necessarily harm public confidence in the in-
tegrity of the bar and the justice system.
The court will consider each case on its own facts and will give
considerable weight to the recommendation of the Ethics Committee.
However, if the underlying offense is such that reinstatement would
adversely affect public confidence in the administration of justice
and integrity of the bar, the court will not consider the factors that
determine rehabilitation, but will deny reinstatement as a matter of
duty.
84. Id. at 239-40, 273 S.E.2d at 574.
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III. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF REINSTATEMENT LAW
A. Early Cases-Principles and Practice
Three general rules were recognized as early as fifty years ago:
a "lax rule," "a strict rule," and a "reasonable middle rule." 85 The
distinction lay in whether disbarment was considered necessarily a
permanent condition or whether the circumstances of the individual
case determined permanency. Most courts considered that disbar-
ment is not necessarily a permanent condition and recognized the
right of disbarred attorneys to petition for reinstatement.8 6 Juris-
dictions within this category will follow either the "lax rule" or
"reasonable middle rule."
Courts employing the liberal "rule of laxity" consider the pe-
tition for reinstatement equivalent to an original application for ad-
mission and base readmission on the same standards.87 Those states
employing the "reasonable middle rule" are unwilling to forever
preclude a convicted wrongdoer from returning to a former position
of trust on the theory that wrongdoers should be given a second
chance upon proof of reformation. 8 Courts that follow the "middle
rule" still require, however, that the petitioner satisfy the burden
of proving rehabilitation and competency before reinstatement will
be granted.89
85. In re Stump, 272 Ky. 593, 597, 114 S.W.2d 1094, 1096 (1938). Kentucky appears to be an
anomaly in that the court professes to fall within the category of jurisdictions that adhere to the
"reasonable middle rule" despite "section 97, Kentucky Statutes, [which declares] that no person
convicted of treason or felony shall be permitted to practice law in any court as counsel or attorney
at law." Id. at 596, 114 S.W.2d at 1096. Moreover, the court cites its previous holdings which state
that even a pardoned felon cannot be reinstated, because "relief from the penal consequences of his
act does not reinvest in the man those qualities of good character so essential for an attorney at law
to possess." Id.
86. The court noted, "[ilt is a well-settled principle that disbarment is not res adjudicata or
necessarily permanent, and that a disbarred attorney may be reinstated for reasons satisfactory to the
court." Id. at 596, 114 S.W.2d at 1096.
87. Id. at 593, 114 S.W.2d at 1094.
88. Id.
89. In Stump, a Kentucky statute precluding reinstatement to the bar of convicted felons was
held not applicable because the petitioner had not been convicted by a jury. Nevertheless, the petition
for reinstatement was denied. The petitioner, who had been disbarred for accepting bribes to alter
a prosecution while serving as prosecuting attorney, was denied reinstatement because he failed to
convince the court of his rehabilitation. Nevertheless, the court expressly maintained its contention
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General standards by which to judge the qualifications of a pe-
titioner for reinstatement were laid out in In re Stump as follows:
[I]f the disbarred attorney can prove after the expiration of a reasonable length
of time that he appreciates the significance of his derelictions; has lived a con-
sistent life of probity and integrity, and shows that he possesses that good char-
acter necessary to guarantee uprightness and honor in his professional dealings
and the faithful discharge of his duties as a lawyer, and therefore is worthy to
be restored, the court will so orderY'
Louisiana provides an example of the "strict rule", as shown
by the opinion of In re Wolff. 91 The Supreme Court of Louisiana
acknowledged that, even though it had inherent power to revoke a
decree of disbarment, it "would not be disposed to exercise that
power, no matter how sympathetic the members of the court might
be, unless perhaps, on being convinced that an error was committed,
or an injustice done, in rendering the decree of disbarment. '"92 Even
though the petitioner in Wolff proved to the court's satisfaction that
he had atoned for his wrongs and was of good character, the court
steadfastly refused to let "sympathies stand in the way of . . .re-
sponsibilities" and denied reinstatement. 93
In the year following Wolff, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
reaffirmed its non-reinstatement policy in State v. Gowland.94 In
Gowland, the court denied a petition for reinstatement, even though
the petitioner had received a pardon and reestablished his good cit-
izenship and reputation. 95 The petitioner applied for reinstatement
six years later also, but the application was again refused.
96
In the early cases, statutes typically mandated disbarment of at-
torneys convicted of a felony, but the statutes made no provision
90. Id. at 599, 114 S.W.2d at 1097.
91. In re Wolff, 173 La. 257, 136 So. 583 (1931).
92. Id. at 258, 136 So. at 584. The petitioner was disbarred for repeated acts of moral turpitude
arising from the gross professional misconduct of misappropriating clients' funds. In re Wolff, 165
La. 641, 115 So. 809 (1928).
93. Wolff, 173 La. at 258, 136 So. at 584.
94. State v. Gowland, 174 La. 351, 140 So. 500 (1932).
95. Id. The court cited the Rules of the Court which state that "when a member of the bar
has been disbarred because of his having been convicted of a felony, and is afterwards pardoned,
'the court, upon application, may vacate or modify such order of disbarment.' " Id. at 353-54, 140
So. at 501.
96. State v. Gowland, 189 La. 80, 179 So. 41 (1938).
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for reinstatement. When courts denied reinstatement, denial was
usually based on the lack of statutory power to reinstate. If a court
held that reinstatement was within its inherent power, but never-
theless denied reinstatement, then the court did so based on its duty
to protect the public from unscrupulous lawyers. 97
B. Recent Trend-Principles and Policies
The trend in recent decades has been for states to abolish statutes
which require permanent disbarment and replace them with State
Bar rules under the control of the judiciary. The bar rules may still
require disbarment upon conviction of a crime of moral turpitude,
but the rules include procedures designed to provide the attorney
with the opportunity to be heard and to enable the court to judge
each case on its own merits. 98
The general rule is that disbarment is not intended, in all cases,
to permanently preclude reinstatement. 99 The courts that unequiv-
ocally reject the concept of permanent disbarment have tended to
97. See, e.g., Wolff, 173 La. 257, 136 So. 583; Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. at 283, 290,
14 S.E.2d 771, 774 (1941); In re Stump, 272 Ky. 593, 596, 114 S.W.2d 1094, 1096 (1938); People
v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404 (1969).
98. Colorado, Kentucky and West Virginia are examples of states that formerly applied strict
rules based on statutory mandates but have replaced the strict statutes with procedures that allow
discretion by their supreme courts.
Part 17 of article 10 of title 39 of the Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, which prohibited any
person convicted of a felony from practicing law in any court in the state, was repealed in 1972 after
being on the books in one form or another since 1868, eight years before statehood.
Section 100 of chapter 30 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes was repealed in 1948. The statute
declared that "[n]o person convicted of a felony shall be permitted to practice law in any court."
See In re May, 249 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1952).
Chapter 30, article 2, section 7 of the West Virginia Code was enacted in 1923 to allow any
West Virginia court of record to suspend or annul the license of an attorney for malpractice. Section
30-2-7 was superseded in 1945 by § 51-1-4a and by the By-Laws of the State Bar and their amendments
and, also, the 1974 amendments to article VIII of the West Virginia Constitution. Carey v. Dostert,
294 S.E.2d 137, 138 (W. Va. 1982).
Based on Carey, chapter 30, article 2, section 6 of the West Virginia Code which mandates
annulment of an attorney's license upon conviction of a felony, is probably obsolete as well, being
superseded by article 6, § 23 of the By-Laws of the State Bar. Both chapter 30, article 2 of the West
Virginia Code and article 6, section 23 of the State Bar By-Laws mandate annulment of an attorney's
license upon conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. The latter section, however, is a Court
Rule under the control of the Supreme Court of Appeals.
99. Annotation, Reinstatement of Attorney After Disbarment, Suspension, or Resignation, 70
A.L.R.2D 268, § 3 (1960).
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focus on the uncertainty inherent in the balancing process and the
ever-present possibility of true reform by the individual petitioner. 1°°
The majority view undoubtedly should be considered the "reason-
able middle rule" as described in Stump °10 and perhaps represented
by Hiss.1
0 2
The rationale underlying the "reasonable middle rule" is based
on a fundamental precept of the legal and correctional system; re-
habilitation and reform are always possible and should be rewarded
under proper circumstances. 10 3 Basic fairness to the errant individual
requires that the opportunity be given to provide proof of regen-
eration and fitness which warrant readmission to the bar.'0 The Hiss
factors are designed to make it possible for the errant attorney to
prove that he has the moral qualifications and competency required
for readmission. 05
One group of states that generally follows the "reasonable middle
rule" differs in its focus on the severity and egregiousness of the
offense. This group of states holds that certain offenses are, by their
very nature, so severe and egregious as to permanently bar rein-
statement. This group places higher importance on the adverse effect
on public confidence in the integrity of the bar and the adminis-
tration of justice when attorneys convicted of serious felonies are
reinstated. 106
Offenses sufficient by their very nature to preclude reinstatement
are rarely encountered and are usually identified by inference and
100. See, e.g., In re Raimondi, 285 Md. 607, 617, 403 A.2d 1234, 1239 (1979) ("[tlhere may
be a point in time when it is proper to reinstate to the practice of law even one who has committed
a most heinous crime."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1033 (1980); In re Hiss, 368 Mass. at 447, 333 N.E.2d
429, 433 (1975) ("[w]e cannot now say that any offense is so grave that a disbarred attorney is
automatically precluded from attempting to demonstrate through ample and adequate proofs . . .
that he has achieved a 'present fitness' . to serve as an attorney . . . in spite of his previous
actions." (citation omitted).
101. In re Stump, 272 Ky. 593, 114 S.W.2d 1094 (1938). See also the textual discussion at III.A
of this paper.
102. Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429.
103. In re Allen, 400 Mass. 417, 509 N.E.2d 1158 (1987).
104. Id.
105. Hiss, 368 Mass. at 456, 333 N.E.2d at 436. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
106. See generally Comment, Attorney Reinstatement Standards: A Proposal for Reform in
Washington State, 62 WASH. L. Rv. 723 (1987) (authored by Anne Badgley). See also In re Brown,
166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567 (1980).
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generalities. Among the states that express the view that certain of-
fenses may preclude reinstatement are Illinois,'0 7 Kansas, 08 Minne-
sota,t°9 Vermont, tt0 and West Virginia."'
Courts that follow the "strict rule" agree with the proposition
that disbarment for felony convictions and other crimes of moral
turpitude should be permanent. Among the jurisdictions that follow
the "strict rule" are the District of Columbia," 2 New York,"3 pos-
sibly Utah," 4 and Louisiana. 1 5 Statutory mandate typically controls
in jurisdictions that follow the "strict rule." However, regardless
of whether the basis is statutory or common law, the underlying
rationale is always concern for protecting the public from the dis-
honest lawyer. It might be surmised that part of the rationale is
107. In re Rothenberg, 108 1l1.2d 313, 326, 484 N.E.2d 289, 295 (1985) ("Clearly, there are
certain infractions that are so serious that the attorney committing them should never be readmitted
to the practice of law.").
108. State v. Russo, 230 Kan. 5, 10, 630 P.2d 711, 715 (1981) ("[T]he seriousness of the un-
derlying offense leading to disbarment may, as a threshold matter, preclude reinstatement such that
further inquiry as to rehabilitation [of the petitioner] is not warranted.") (quoting In re Brown, 166
W. Va. 226, 240, 273 S.E.2d 567, 574 (1980)).
109. In re Van Vyck, 225 Minn. 90, 90, 29 N.W.2d 654, 654-55 (1947) (The court refused even
to appoint a referee to take testimony on the reinstatement petition "[o]n account of the heinous
moral turpitude of the offense of which the applicant was convicted and . . . disbarred .... ).
110. In re Harrington, 134 Vt. 549, 555, 367 A.2d 161, 165 (1976) (The court agreed that "there
may be an 'unforgiveable' [sic] crime, a crime for which readmission to practice, by the very nature
of the wrong, could not be justified.").
111. In re Brown, 166 W. Va. 226, 240, 273 S.E.2d 567, 574 (1980) "[T]he seriousness of the
underlying offense leading to disbarment may, as a threshold matter, preclude reinstatement such that
further inquiry as to rehabilitation is not warranted.").
112. In re Kerr, 424 A.2d 94 (D.C. 1980). The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that
title 11, Chapter 2503(a) of the District of Columbia Code Annotated § 11-2503(a) (1973), precludes
reinstatement except in the event a pardon is granted. The court held the statute to be consistent
with title 11, chapter 2501 of the District of Columbia Code Annotated (1973), which the court
interpreted as granting authority over "original admission" but not over reinstatement. Kerr, 424
A.2d 98.
113. Section 90 of The New York Judiciary Law (McKinney 1983) requires automatic disbarment
of an attorney upon conviction of a felony but allows the court discretion in reinstatement upon
reversal of the felony conviction. In re Sugarmann, 64 A.D.2d 166, 168, 409 N.Y.S.2d 224, 226
(1978). See also Barash v. Association of Bar of City of N.Y., 20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896, 281
N.Y.S.2d 997 (1967).
114. Although no Utah case law interprets the statute, title 78, chapter 51, section 37 of the
Utah Code requires disbarment upon conviction of a felony and may be interpreted as to preclude
subsequent reinstatement.
115. See, e.g., Gowland, 174 La. 351, 140 So. 500; Wolff, 173 La. 257, 136 So. 583. No recent
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based on the belief that character is static.116 Therefore, once a per-
son is shown to be dishonest by a felony conviction, the presumption
cannot be rebutted by subsequent conduct.
IV. ADMISSION OF FnsT-TIME APPLICANTS WITH FELONY
RECORDS
A. What Standards Determine Good Moral Character?
Common sense might lead one to believe that standards for read--
mission of a disbarred felon should also apply to first-time appli-
cants with felony records. The question is basically the same, whether
the person is a "fit and proper person to be permitted to practice
law [or] likely to continue to commit acts of moral turpitude.
1 1 7
Some courts do, however, apply a more lenient standard in the case
of first-time applicants."' Other courts expressly apply the same
standard used for reinstatement proceedings,119 and at least one court
applies the standard used in disbarment cases.1 20
1. Examples of Standards Considered By Courts.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied a more le-
nient standard to first-time applicants in In re Manville,1 21 because
116. See, e.g., In re Wright, 102 Wash. 2d 855, 874, 690 P.2d 1134, 1144 (1984) (Williams,
C.J., dissenting).
117. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 453, 421 P.2d 76, 81, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 228, 233 (1966).
118. E.g., In re Dileo, 307 So.2d 362 (La. 1975); In re Manville, 538 A.2d 1128 (D.C. 1988).
119. E.g., In re Belsher, 102 Wash. 2d 844, 689 P.2d 1078 (1984); In re Estes, 580 P.2d 977
(Okla. 1978).
120. Hallinan, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228.
121. Manville, 538 A.2d at 1135-36. In no uncertain terms the court said: "[w]e are satisfied
that this court can adopt a rule for the admission of applicants who have committed felonies that
differs from the rule it employs in connection with the application for readmission of a former attorney
who was disbarred for committing a felony." Id. The distinction is "between members of the bar
who are convicted of crimes of moral turpitude and bar applicants previously convicted of such
crimes." Id. at 1136. In other words, an applicant who suffered a conviction prior to his first bar
application is judged on a lesser standard because the conviction occurred while the applicant was
not yet bound by an attorney's ethical obligations.
Another basis for the court's holding is that "while D.C. Code § 11-2501(a) (1981) gives this
court plenary authority over the original admission of attorneys to the bar, no statute gives it plenary
authority over readmission cases." Id. In addition, the court questioned the constitutionality of a per
se rule that bars admission of convicted felons by stating that such a rule may be a violation of due
process and equal protection. Id. at 1132.
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"[tihe lawyer has a special duty as an officer of the court to uphold
the law." The lawyer takes an oath to uphold the law; therefore,
criminal conduct by a lawyer is "more reprehensible than similar
conduct by lay persons .... ",122 Although the lawyer's oath dis-
tinguishes the reinstatement case from an initial application, the court,
nevertheless, applied standards to first-time applicants that are es-
sentially the same as the Hiss standards commonly used in rein-
statement proceedings. The factors considered by the court were as
follows:
1) the nature and character of the offenses committed;
2) the number and duration of offenses;
3) the age and maturity of the applicant when the offenses were
committed;
4) the social and historical context in which the offenses were
committed;
5) the sufficiency of the punishment undergone and restitution
made in connection with the offenses;
6) the grant or denial of a pardon for offenses committed;
7) the number of years that have elapsed since the last offense
was committed, and the presence or absence of misconduct dur-
ing that period;
8) the applicant's current attitude about the prior offenses (e.g.,
acceptance of responsibility for and renunciation of past wrong-
doing, and remorse);
9) the applicant's candor, sincerity and full disclosure in the
filings and proceedings on character and fitness;
10) the applicant's constructive activities and accomplishments
subsequent to the criminal convictions; and
122. Id. at 1136. Although the court appears to be sanctioning a double standard, it may be
explained by noting its acquiescence to statutory authority on the issue of readmission where most
courts assert judicial authority. On the subject of admission, the court merely applies the majority
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11) the opinions of character witnesses about the applicant's moral
fitness. 123
Louisiana is another state where a distinction is ostensibly made
between the applicable standards. 124 The Supreme Court of Louis-
iana expressly "rejects a rigid rule that transgressions of a non-
lawyer when he is later considered for moral fitness to be admitted
to the Bar are analogous to the disciplinary rules and sanctions ap-
plicable to licensed attorneys."' 125 The Supreme Court of Louisiana
left open the possibility, however, that conduct of a certain "degree
of moral turpitude" might preclude a petitioner from admission for-
ever.126
Along with the foregoing jurisdictions, New York also seems to
apply a lesser standard to first-time applicants than to petitioners
for reinstatement.
127
The leniency of the foregoing jurisdictions may be a direct result
of their jurisdictional situations. That is, their attempts to distinguish
the two standards may be a conscious effort to apply a more lenient,
discretionary standard to initial applicants because discretion is not
available to them in reinstatement proceedings. Accordingly, in ad-
missions proceedings, the foregoing jurisdictions expressly reject the
"strict standard" in favor of the more lenient majority standards.
As stated in In re Dileo, "[w]e prefer to consider the facts of each
case on the basis of the totality of the circumstances which brings
the applicant before us. "128
On the contrary, the Supreme Court of Florida applies a stricter
standard to admissions applications than that applied in disciplinary
and reinstatement proceedings. 129 The standard for determining good
moral character for purposes of first-time admission considers not
123. Id. at 1133 n.4. See also Comment, Past Crimes and Admission to the Bar, supra note
18, for a very similar list of nine considerations used by the California Committee of Bar Examiners
to evaluate the moral character of an applicant.
124. In re Dileo, 307 So.2d 362 (La. 1975).
125. Id. at 364.
126. Id. at 365.
127. In re Kesselman, 100 A.D.2d 606, 473 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1984).
128. Dileo, 307 So.2d at 364.
129. In re Florida Board of Bar Examiners, 373 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1979).
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only acts that involve moral turpitude, but conduct that would cause
a reasonable person to have substantial doubts about the applicant's
"honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the
laws of the state and nation." 10 The Supreme Courts of Oklahoma",
and Washington 32 expressly apply reinstatement standards to ad-
missions proceedings, whereas the Supreme Court of New Jersey 33
implicitly applies reinstatement standards without distinguishing be-
tween the two situations.
In the case of In re Belsher, the Supreme Court of Washington
gives two reasons for applying reinstatement standards to first-time
applicants as well. The first reason is because of "the absence of
reported decisions in [the] jurisdiction dealing with the nature of an
initial applicant's burden to demonstrate good moral charac-
ter . . ",114 The second reason is based on "the common purpose
underlying both reinstatement and admission proceedings .... "135
The position of initial applicants and candidates for reinstate-
ment is very similar where both have records of serious misconduct;
therefore, the Supreme Court of Washington holds that it is "rea-
sonable to require of each similar burdens of proof with respect to
whether such conduct is likely to occur again.' ' 36
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma appears to apply reinstatement
standards for fairness reasons. The court pointed out, in In re Estes,
that attorneys disbarred for crimes of moral turpitude could petition
for reinstatement after five years and "[s]urely the same consid-
eration should be afforded [the initial] applicant.' ' 37
The Supreme Court of California appears to be a maverick by
equating admission standards with standards applied in disciplinary
130. Id. at 892 (quoting Florida Board of Bar Examiners re G. W.L., 364 So.2d 454, 458 (Fla.
1978)).
131. In re Estes, 580 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1978).
132. In re Belsher, 102 Wash. 2d 844, 689 P.2d 1078 (1984).
133. In re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 462 A.2d 165 (1983).
134. Belsher, 102 Wash. 2d at 850, 689 P.2d at 1082.
135. Id. at 851, 689 P.2d at 1082.
136. Id. at 852, 689 P.2d at 1083.
137. Estes, 580 P.2d at 980.
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proceedings." 8 However, once the court affirmed that the applicant
has the burden of proving fitnessy3 9 it was clear that the court ac-
tually applied the readmission standard rather than the disciplinary
standard.
2. Key Factors Considered By Courts In Admissions
Proceedings.
Several key factors are often cited by courts, regardless of whether
the court is denying or approving an application for admission. For
instance, courts require applicants to be candid in the entire ap-
plication process. 140 Except when constitutionally protected answers
are solicited by the bar examiners,' 14 applicants must answer fully
and truthfully, neither minimizing nor hiding criminal records and
misdeeds. 
142
The Board of Examiners and the court view any attempt by an
applicant to mislead the Board as equivalent to blatant dishonesty.
Creating false impressions raises a very strong presumption of bad
moral character and unfitness to practice law because such conduct
is likely to continue in the applicant's professional career.
143
Expressions of remorse by the applicant who has committed se-
rious crimes are considered an important indicator of rehabilita-
tion. 144 Lack of express evidence of sorrow or repentance during the
application process shows lack of reform and a greater probability
that past misdeeds will continue.
138. Hallinan v. Committee of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1966).
139. Id. at 450, 421 P.2d at 80, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
140. See Annotation, Falsehoods, Misrepresentations, Impersonations, and Other Irresponsible
Conduct as Bearing On Requisite Good Moral Character for Admission to Bar, 30 A.L.R. 4TH 1020,
§ 5 (1984). In re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 82, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (1983).
141. Pushinsky v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 164 W. Va. 736, 266 S.E.2d 444 (1980).
142. In re Elkins, 308 N.C. 317, 302 S.E.2d 215 (1983), reh'g denied, 308 N.C. 681, 311 S.E.2d
590 (1983); In re Moore, 308 N.C. 771, 303 S.E.2d 810 (1983); In re Belsher, 102 Wash. 2d 844,
689 P.2d 1078 (1984); Lark v. West, 182 F. Supp. 794, 798 n.3 (D.D.C. 1960), affd, 289 F.2d 898,
110 U.S. App. D.C. 157 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 865 (1961).
143. See generally Annotation, Admission to Bar - Good Moral Character, 30 A.L.R. 4TrH
1020, § 5 (1984).
144. Belsher, 102 Wash. 2d at 853, 689 P.2d at 1084; In re Wright, 102 Wash. 2d 855, 859,
690 P.2d 1134, 1136 (1984). -
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Courts consider the pattern of the applicant's conduct since the
conviction to be strong evidence of moral character at the time of
application.145 For example, evidence that an applicant was an unruly
prisoner while incarcerated will weigh heavily against a finding of
reformation. 46 Evidence that the applicant committed even minor
offenses during the interim since conviction will also weigh heavily
against a finding of rehabilitation. 147
Courts note other factors, to a lesser extent, that contribute to
a finding of present fitness.148 However, if one factor implicitly weighs
heavier than all others and provides a solution to the puzzle of good
moral character, it would have to be sincere rehabilitation.
Courts try to find that rehabilitation has occurred and, generally,
will examine all the evidence which an applicant presents. Based on
due process requirements, refusal to give an applicant, at a mini-
mum, a fair hearing may be a thing of the past.149 Even if an ap-
plication is denied because a serious offense is in the applicant's
record, it is not uncommon for courts to acknowledge the possibility
of subsequent admission. In cases where sincere rehabilitation is
present, all other factors will probably work to outweigh any neg-
ative evidence.
It stands to reason that a person who is sincerely rehabilitated
will usually have friends and acquaintances who will convincingly
testify in his behalf. If the applicant is sincerely rehabilitated, courts
will probably recognize it. Subjectivity should not work against the
applicant who is sincerely rehabilitated.
Just as in the readmission context, courts rarely speak of specific
crimes that preclude admission for the first-time applicant. The se-
145. See, e.g., In re Haukebo, 352 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. 1984).
146. In re G.L.S., 586 F. Supp. 375 (D. Md. 1984), aff'd, 745 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1984).
147. See, e.g., Nail v. Board of Bar Examiners, 98 N.M. 172, 646 P.2d 1236 (1982).
148. E.g., In re Taylor, 293 Or. 285, 647 P.2d 462 (1982) (discharge of student loans in bank-
ruptcy without extraordinary hardship); Belsher, 102 Wash. 2d at 853, 689 P.2d at 1084 (absence of
continuing record of progress regarding psychological ailment); In re G.S., 291 Md. 182, 433 A.2d
1159 (1981) (insufficient evidence presented).
149. E.g. In re Van Wyck, 225 Minn. 90, 90, 29 N.W.2d 654, 654-55 (1947) ("On account of
the heinous moral turpitude of the offense [causing disbarment], this court would not be justified in
appointing a referee to take testimony in support of or in opposition to the application for rein-
statement and would not be justified in reinstating the applicant . . ").
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verity of the actual crime is, of course, considered, but it is only
one factor among many. Rehabilitation is supreme, for this is what
determines the future conduct of the applicant and persuades the
court to admit the applicant to the practice of law.
3. Constitutional Limitations on Admissions Standards
The states and their courts traditionally exercise exclusive control
over the standards for admission and readmission. 150 The vast ma-
jority of jurisdictions adopt some combination of the factors enu-
merated in Manville.151 In general, states can require that an applicant
possess integrity and high moral character, notwithstanding the in-
herent vagueness of those terms. However, constitutional limitations
do apply. The United States Supreme Court has held that state ad-
mission standards must rationally relate to fitness or capacity to
practice law.
152
Unfortunately, the constitutional limitation is almost as vague
as the standards themselves. For example, how does one determine
whether a felony committed outside the practice of law will ne-
cessarily impair the ability to practice law? 53 Is a person unfit to
practice law because he committed a "victimless" crime? Perhaps
the distinction between types of criminal conduct is necessitated by
the increase in statutory felonies that are relatively victimless in com-
parison to traditional common law felonies.
The issue has been addressed in terms of "illegal" conduct versus
"criminal" conduct. 5 4 The distinction is recognized and addressed
in the Model Rules as follows:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such
as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income
150. In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286, 287 (1953), rev'd, 348 U.S. 1 (1954).
151. See generally Annotation, Falsehoods, Misrepresentations, Impersonations, and Other Ir-
responsible Conduct as Bearing On Requisite Good Moral Character for Admission to Bar, 30 A.L.R.
4TH 1020, § 4 (1984); Annotation, Criminal Record as Affecting Applicant's Moral Character for
Purposes of Admission to the Bar, 88 A.L.R. 3D 192, § 2 (1978); 7 Am. JuR. 2D Attorneys of Law
§ 16 (1980).
152. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of N.M., 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
153. McChrystal, supra note 16, at 91.
154. Id. at 86.
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tax return. However, some kinds of offense carry no such implication. Tradi-
tionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral tur-
pitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters
of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no
specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is per-
sonally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally
answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant
to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty or breach of trust, or
serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A
pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered
separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.'"
Compare the general requirement of EC 1-3, that an applicant
be of good moral character, 56 with the Model Rules requirement,
that the applicant tell the truth and correct any misunderstandings
that arise during the admissions process . 5 7 The comparison reveals
quite a contrast in the requirements.
Actually, a person may be considered immoral by one person's
standards but yet be a very fine lawyer. However, a person who is
dishonest in the admissions process would probably continue to be
dishonest in the practice of law.
The importance of the holding in Schware v. Board of Bar Ex-
aminers of the State of New Mexico, may lie more in its restriction
on the use of presumptions than in any fundamental change in the
standards themselves. Good moral character is still a valid require-
ment for admission to the bar, but, more importantly, good moral
character at the time of application for admission. 8 In order to
determine whether an applicant's moral character is good at the time
of application, a court must consider all the relevant circumstances
surrounding the felony conviction.
The applicant must meet a heavy burden when attempting to
prove rehabilitation, although it might require only a preponderance
of the evidence. 159 Even though a felony conviction provides evidence
155. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 comment (1987).
156. MODEL CODE OF PRoFEssioNAL R SPONsmIiTY EC 1-3 (1981).
157. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (1987).
158. See generally Annotation, Falsehood, Misrepresentations, Impersonations, and Other Ir-
responsible Conduct as Bearing On Requisite Good Moral Character for Admission to Bar, 30 A.L.R.
4T-H 1020, § 4 (1984).
159. In re Manville, 538 A.2d 1128, 1134 (D.C. 1988). Cf. In re Belsher, 102 Wash. 2d 844,
851, 689 P.2d 1082, 1083 (1984) (convincing proof of full and complete rehabilitation).
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of "moral turpitude," "a rule denying bar admission to all appli-
cants who have felony convictions might contravene constitutional
guarantees of due process or equal protection of the laws." 16°
The same rationale which underlies the "reasonable middle
rule' 1 61 in the reinstatement context provides a justification for con-
sidering first-time applicants who have felony convictions as valid
candidates for admission; rehabilitation is always possible, and jus-
tice requires that errant citizens be afforded the opportunity to prove
themselves. Furthermore, it is good social policy to reward those
who have rehabilitated themselves as an incentive for others to strive
for self-improvement.
Furthermore, determinations of fitness and good moral character
are necessarily subjective and are by their nature difficult to predict.
Some consider the process of ad hoc evaluation of present moral
character unfair because it provides little guidance to potential ap-
plicants who have gone astray in bygone years.
62
However, rather than return to the "fairness" of per se rules,
the present discretionary standards should be continued and allowed
to evolve over time, even as the common law evolves over time.
The advantage (which could also be considered a disadvantage) lies
in the flexibility of discretionary determination. If per se rules tend
to work injustice, it stands to reason that discretion would tend to
work toward justice when exercised judiciously. But more impor-
tantly, discretionary rules will change to reflect the mores of society
and the community.
4. What Offenses Involving Moral Turpitude May Preclude
Admission to the Bar?
The Supreme Court of Washington and the Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division, New York, provide an answer to the question of
whether any crime may preclude admission. The applications of con-
160. Manville, 538 A.2d at 1132.
161. See textual discussion at III.
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victed murderers were denied in In re Wright163 and In re Roger
"'MM. "164 However, even Wright does not clearly hold that second
degree murder will always preclude admission to the bar.
The dissent sharply criticized the majority's opinion as evidencing
"an inflexible rejection of the view that a person can redeem himself
from past violations and can work to become a useful and pro-
ductive citizen."' 6 The dissent's criticism appears to be well-taken,
based on the majority's remark that it had found no case where a
convicted murderer had been admitted to the practice of law. The
court's remark could be interpreted as support for its belief that a
second degree murderer could not possibly rehabilitate himself suf-
ficiently to be admitted to the bar, simply because no cases had yet
reported such a finding. 166
Considering the dissent's contention that the applicant had
"proven himself worthy to be admitted to practice," 1 67 one can con-
sider the majority's rejection as less than absolute and probably
based more on the views of the individual justices in the majority
than on the moral turpitude of the offense. In fact, the majority
expressly left open the possibility that the applicant could refile for
admission in the future.1 68
First degree murder may be the offense that clearly precludes
admission. In Roger "'MM, " a brief memorandum decision states
that the "petitioner's history of past criminal conduct, which in-
cludes convictions for bank robbery and first-degree murder, would
operate to disqualify him, on character grounds, from being ad-
mitted to practice as an attorney [in] New York."' 69 However, in
Roger "'MM, " the murder conviction was not the only serious of-
fense in the applicant's record. Therefore, the holding does not lead
to an absolute conclusion that a murder conviction, standing alone,
163. In re Wright, 102 Wash. 2d 855, 690 P.2d 1134 (1984).
164. In re Roger "MM," 96 A.D.2d 1133, 466 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1983).
165. Wright, 102 Wash. 2d at 873, 690 P.2d at 1144 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 859, 690 P.2d at 1136.
167. Id. at 874, 690 P.2d at 1144 (Williams, C.J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 861-62, 690 P.2d at 1137.
169. Roger "MM," 96 A.D.2d 1133, 466 N.Y.S.2d 873.
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would operate to preclude admission to the bar. Unfortunately, the
court gives no analysis in its decision.
B. The General State of the Law
At present, case law presents a checkerboard of precedent when
viewed on the surface. Nevertheless, good moral character is uni-
versally recognized as a vital prerequisite to admission, 170 and a fel-
ony conviction does not necessarily preclude one's admission to the
bar. 171 Otherwise, hardly any other general rules can be drawn.
Courts consider a felony record an important factor when re-
viewing an initial applicant for admission. A felony conviction raises
a rebuttable presumption of an unfit character, but, as in reinstate-
ment cases, very few courts give this factor conclusive weight unless
the felony involved such a degree of moral turpitude "that it should
forever bar him from the practice of law . .. 172
For example, evidence of theft, perjury, and dismissal of law
student loans can warrant denial of admission even without con-
viction, especially where mitigating circumstances are few.17 1 On the
other hand, a conviction for conspiracy to import marijuana was
not enough in an Oklahoma case to preclude admission, where the
applicant met his burden of proving rehabilitation, current good
character, and respect for the law. 174
The United States District Court for Maryland refused to admit
to its bar an applicant who had been convicted of armed bank rob-
bery more than fifteen years prior to application.175 The court held
that a pardon would be necessary for his admission to its bar despite
170. Annotation, Criminal Record as Affecting Applicant's Moral Character for Purposes of
Admission to the Bar, 88 A.L.R. 3D 192, § 2 (1978).
171. 7 A . JuR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 15 (1980).
172. In re Dileo, 307 So.2d 362, 365 (La. 1975). Apparently, as in reinstatement cases, it is
easier to intimate such a crime exists than it is to state what such a crime might be. Note that the
Supreme Court of Louisiana gave no indication of what degree of moral turpitude might forever bar
one from the practice of law.
173. In re Taylor, 293 Or. 285, 647 P.2d 462 (1982). See also In re G.S., 291 Md. 182, 433
A.2d 1159 (1981).
174. In re Estes, 580 P.2d 977 (Okla. 1978).
175. In re G.L.S., 586 F. Supp. 375 (D. Md. 1984), aff'd, 745 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1984).
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the applicant's admission into the Maryland State Bar.' 76 By re-
quiring the applicant to submit to the parole process, the court was
assured that it would receive additional evidence with which to de-
termine the applicant's reformation.177
In addition, the court held that any doubts about whether the
"standard [for admission to the federal bar] has been met must be
resolved in favor of the public.' ' 78 In contrast, other courts resolve
doubts in favor of the applicant. 79
In Manville,'t 0 the felony convictions at issue included voluntary
manslaughter, bank robbery, and sale of narcotics. The passage of
over ten years since each of the convictions probably facilitated a
successful rebuttal of the presumption of moral unfitness.1 81 Manville
is an example of how serious a criminal conviction can be and still
be overcome by a sufficient record and solid evidence of rehabili-
tation.
Ultimately, the subjective nature of the inquiry into moral char-
acter will depend on the particular facts of the case. More impor-
tantly, however, the determination will depend upon the sympathies
and outlook of the court. Hopefully, justice will always be of prime
consideration as well as the integrity of the bar. Standards are certain
to change over time, but when confidence in the judiciary suffers,
the damage is difficult to repair. Respect for the judiciary and the
legal system in general can hardly be overvalued as a vitally im-
portant element in the operation of our society.
V. CONCLUSION
Although recent reinstatement decisions by the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals have been somewhat erratic and contro-
176. Id. at 380.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 379.
179. Nail v. Board of Bar Examiners, 98 N.M. 172, 646 P.2d 1236 (1982); Hallinan v. Committee
of Bar Examiners, 65 Cal. 2d 447, 421 P.2d 76, 55 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1966).
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versial,'1 the court appears to follow the majority view. The majority
view holds that attorneys who are disbarred after a felony conviction
can be reinstated to the bar upon a proper showing of moral re-
habilitation and fitness to practice law. 183 The court also falls within
the category of courts that holds certain offenses to be so repre-
hensible by their nature, as to preclude reinstatement.
18 4
It appears likely that an attorney will be unable to satisfy the
burden of proving the requisite moral qualifications for reinstate-
ment after being convicted of more than one felony involving the
perversion of the justice system or abuse of the political process.
Furthermore, the burden of showing that reinstatement would not
adversely affect public confidence in the justice system will probably
be insurmountable, especially if the attorney's disbarment was sur-
rounded by much press and public attention.
West Virginia has no recent case on record of a first-time ap-
plicant with a criminal record. However, based on the case of In
re Eary,85 decided in 1950, West Virginia's admission law appears
to be consistent with the current majority view. In both reinstate-
ment cases and first-time applications, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals would not consider that any but the most heinous
crimes constitute an absolute disqualification from the practice of
law.
One of the disadvantages of sacrificing statutory proscriptions
in favor of a balancing system is the difficulty of maintaining the
consistency that is so vital for public confidence. When the public's
182. The vacillation is evident from the apparently smooth development in the law from Ex
parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E.2d 771 (1941), to In re Brown, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d
567 (1980) and the intervening opinion and vehement dissent of In re Smith, 166 W. Va. 22, 270
S.E.2d 768 (1980) (opinion withdrawn). See supra, notes 16-71 and accompanying text. It is noteworthy
that Brown emphasized the adverse affect on the public confidence in the justice system as part of
its justification for denying reinstatement outright. Brown, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567.
183. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 96.
185. A pertinent case is In re Eary, 134 W. Va. 204, 58 S.E.2d 647 (1950). In Eary, the pe-
titioner's license had been annulled. He was, therefore, in the position of a first-time applicant seeking
a license to practice. However, evidence showed the petitioner had been convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude. The petitioner failed to prove to the court's satisfaction that he possessed good moral
character and his petition was denied.
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interest in the integrity of the bar and the administration of justice
is just another factor to weigh in the balancing process, the public
interest will occasionally end up on the light side of the scale. Courts
change, however, and eventually corrections in the law can be made.
Consistency may be impossible to attain but it can still be acceptable
if the court will continue to emphasize the importance of the public
interest in the administration of justice and public confidence in the
integrity of the bar.
Adherence to the Brown86 principles to judge reinstatement pe-
titions and applications for first-time admission may provide a basis
for future consistency that will promote public confidence in the
justice system. Justice and constitutional due process considerations
require that attorneys and applicants who have seriously erred be
given the opportunity to prove reformation, but reality tells us that
some crimes are intolerable and simply cannot be overcome.
Leonard W. Copeland
186. Brown, 166 W. Va. 226, 273 S.E.2d 567.
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